A recent ruling by the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco has re-evaluated the definition of a "crime of violence," concluding that hiring a hit man may not always fall under this federal designation, even if a death occurs.

The decision, centered on the case of James Terry Henrikson, vacates two murder-for-hire solicitation convictions by clarifying that the federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 1958(a)) lacks a specific "guilty mind" requirement for the "death results" element, an interpretation that could influence future federal prosecutions.

The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that soliciting murder-for-hire, specifically under 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) when a death results, is not categorically a "crime of violence" under federal law. This significant decision, handed down on July 15, 2026, stems from the appeal of James Terry Henrikson, a former trucking and oil-drilling operator convicted in a North Dakota murder-for-hire scheme.

Henrikson, who is already serving two consecutive life sentences for related charges, challenged two of his solicitation convictions. The three-judge panel—composed of Circuit Judges William A. Fletcher, M. Margaret McKeown, and Lucy H. Koh—found that the "if death results" clause in the murder-for-hire statute itself does not require a separate mens rea, or "guilty mind," regarding the death. This means a defendant could be convicted even if a death was accidental, an aspect which disqualifies the offense as a categorical "crime of violence" under federal law requiring specific intent for all elements.

Circuit Judge Fletcher, writing for the unanimous panel, stated, "We hold that a violation of § 1958(a) resulting in death is not categorically a crime of violence and therefore cannot serve as a predicate offense under § 373(a)." The ruling clarified that while the physical force aspect of the crime might meet certain requirements, the lack of a specific intent requirement for the "death results" element is critical. Judge Fletcher further noted, "Though it is unusual to punish individuals for their 'purely accidental conduct,' 'it is not unusual to punish individuals for the unintended consequences of their unlawful acts.'"

The court reversed the district court's denial of Henrikson's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion as to Counts 7 and 8, instructing the lower court to vacate those two convictions. This ruling, while specific to the interpretation of this particular federal statute and its interaction with the definition of a "crime of violence," highlights a nuanced legal distinction with potential implications for how certain offenses are classified and prosecuted in federal courts across the Ninth Circuit.